Wednesday, 20 December 2017

Instructed by Rosi Braidotti’s text Teratologies, can Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming, which is set against the philosophy of being, satisfy the posthuman condition?

Rosi Braidotti’s contribution to Deleuze and Feminist Theory (2000), Teratologies, reads from Gilles Deleuze a rethinking of the embodied structure of human subjectivity[1]. Braidotti recognises a shift from teleological perfectibility of the human which has been the aim of essentialism, which she claims has ‘spilled over’, and reduced the human body to a surface of representation[2].
In this essay, I will be taking Braidotti’s emphasis on Deleuze to instruct us through the hugely complex expression of ‘becoming’, which I will discuss between Deleuze’s early project Bergsonism (Le Bergsonisme 1966) and in his later collaboration with Felix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus (Mille Plateaux 1987).
The posthuman condition which I will be responding to stems from Braidotti’s own expression, in which she remarks;
 [the aim of] the theoretical masters of nihilistic postmodern aesthetics [...] [is] to launch a sort of euphoric celebration of virtual embodiments[3].
This claim regarding the posthuman condition, holds a dissolution of the integrity of the human subject as a disjunction against the centrality of human identity in Western philosophy. What constitutes the posthuman condition can be fractured into parts; inhuman, nonhuman, all-too-human, anti-anthropocentricism etc., all of which appear across various discourses[4]. The term is multifaceted and it would be reductive of me to attempt to define it succinctly. However, this essay will attempt to demonstrate how an emphasis on nonhuman relations correlate to a criticism of Western discourse, whereby human identity is central and privileged. The term can better be thought of as anti-anthropocentricism; Deleuze’s collaboration with Guattari pervades inhuman or nonhuman agents, whereby a philosophy of becoming is contrary to the static or homogeneity of the ‘philosophy of being’.
Following Braidotti’s text, my initial exploration will lead me to the third chapter in Deleuze’s project Bergsonism, Memory as Virtual Co-existence. Here, we will see how Deleuze breaks away from the dominance of ‘being’, whereby through an ontological reading of Henri Bergson’s Matter and Memory (Matiére et Mémoire 1911), Deleuze recognises a collapse in the foundations on which memory comes into actualisation. This idea, I will argue, overcomes the deep bodily roots of subjectivity, by which being is actualised from ‘virtuality’, or a non-human reality.
The implications of Deleuze’s reading of Bergson will lead us towards the ontology of becoming, which for Deleuze works as a criticism of the philosophy of being[5]. Braidotti will then lead me towards the chapter 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible… to be found in A Thousand Plateaus, drawing on a reading of Baruch Spinoza and Bergson (which Deleuze considers philosophers of difference) to develop an ‘ethology’. I will conclude that Deleuze and Guattari, through prioritising becoming above being, dissolve the sovereignty of the human subject.
Part 1: The ‘Deleuzean Body’ as ‘Enfleshed Memory’.
Braidotti opens the inquiry in the section Enfleshed Complexities of Teratologies with an outline of what she calls the ‘Deleuzean body’. Braidotti initially gives a genealogy of Deleuze’s influences, but it is how Deleuze treats these influences which must first be acknowledged. In Lettre á Michel Cressole (1973) Deleuze writes that he imagines himself latching onto the back of philosophers to impregnate them, ‘giving him a child, which would be his and which would at the same time be a monster.’ Deleuze goes on to say that the author has said everything that Deleuze has made him say, so this child/monster must go through ‘decenterings, slips, breaks, ins, secret emissions’[6]. Braidotti likewise acknowledges this in Deleuze and goes onto suggest a genealogy:
For Deleuze, the genealogy of the embodied nature of the subject can be ironically rendered as: Descartes’ nightmare, Spinoza’s hope, Nietzsche’s complaint, Freud’s obsession, Lacan’s favourite fantasy, Marx’s omission.[7]
I believe that Braiotti missed an essential component to Deleuze’s transformed authors and philosophers; Henri Bergson. Deleuze considers in his text Bergsonism to be the ‘classic case’ of the analogy he made to Cressole[8].
Braidotti recognises a transformation of concepts which Deleuze traces out of Bergson, in describing what she calls the ‘Deleuzean body’. Braidotti tells us that this body or subject is a ‘piece of meat activated by electrical waves of desire’[9], Braidotti appears to suggest a dissolving of identity and a reconstruction of a new materialist body. However, I want to draw attention to her remark on Deleuze, in which she writes:
The Deleuzean body is ultimately an embodied memory.[10]
This remark leads me to an exploration of Deleuze’s project Bergsonism, whereby in the third chapter Memory as Virtual Coexistence Deleuze explores the third chapter of Bergson’s Matter and Memory, in which Deleuze questions the status of past recollections and their impression on the present. Deleuze transforms Bergson’s ‘psychological’ account of the past and imposes an ontological unconsciousness.
Firstly, Deleuze addresses the ‘false problem’ in Bergson’s Matter and Memory “where are recollections preserved?”. Likewise, Bergson asks this very question in the third chapter:
We understand that the psycho-chemical phenomena take place in the brain, that the brain is in the body, the body in the air which surrounds it, etc. ; but the past, once achieved, if it is retained, where is it?[11]
Bergson, like Deleuze recognises that these memories are ‘in time’[12] which calls up duration. Duration, fully explored in his earlier text Time and Free Will (Essai sur Les Données Immédiates de la Conscience 1888), sets the foundations of Matter and Memory, in suggesting that temporality is intuition. That is, the present is a perception of the immediate past with the anticipation or determination of the immediate future[13].
In Matter and Memory, Bergson gives us the example that every perception is already a memory, that we practically only ever perceive the past, and the pure present as ‘being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future’[14].
To further understand Deleuze’s project, I will outline Bergson’s inverted cone diagram which is found in the third chapter of Matter and Memory[15]. Bergson poses the problem of living ‘only in the present’, that is, absent of memory or experience. He calls up this issue by suggesting that it is a quality of the ‘lower animal’, which reacts in surprise by immediate stimulus, or the man of impulse. Likewise, to live in the past, as Bergson so clearly writes, is not a man of impulse ‘but a dreamer’. That is to say, to live in the past absent of any advantage over the present, is futile[16].
Bergson draws us towards the cone diagram[17], which sits on a flat plane, or as Bergson calls it ‘plane of my actual representation of the universe’, which is essentially reality. The inverted cone’s point is labelled S, and as it expands has concentric circuits labelled A”, B”, and further up A’, B’, to A and B. The concentric circuits labelled A and B symbolise the multitudinous images of memories. The memories become more and more varied or multiple as the cone extends. However, as it draws in towards point S, they become more defined and organise themselves towards the present. The point S is where the memory participates in the place of present reality, or the actual representation of the universe[18]. Bergson writes:
A recollection should reappear in consciousness, it is necessary that it should descend from the heights of pure memory down to the precise point where action is taking place[19].
My understanding of the cone diagram is that Bergson shows us how memories or the virtual materialize into action, they become present. Memories cause sensations as it materialises, and as it materializes, according to Bergson, the recollection diminishes from its status as a memory, as it passes into the state of the present[20]. The memory becomes something actually lived, this notion of the past is considered virtual. The virtual is the depths the past, and as Bergson has shown the virtual becomes actual, actual being a sensation acted upon or capable of provoking movement[21]. Bergson writes:
But the truth is that we shall never reach the past unless we frankly place ourselves within it. Essentially virtual, it cannot be known as something past unless we follow and adopt the movement by which it expands into a present image, thus emerging from obscurity into the light of day.[22]
If we consider the recognition of a face, we have to call up past memories. Should the face be of a near relative who you see every week then the memories will be distinct and will take little effort to materialize. The face of a person you went to school with thirty years ago might take a little longer to place, thus we retreat into recollection which exists as an aggregate of images, or the virtual, in which we refine the memory until we can place it into the present or the actual. The very consideration of the face being recognised could be thought of as the past or recollection materialising, thus it appears that past has an advance on the present. Hypothetically, should we never have this position of recollection, then we would be in constant surprise or confusion every time we meet that same close relative.
When Deleuze draws out the distinction in Bergson of where memories or recollections are preserved, he is responding to Bergson where he tells us that the body cannot store up these images, and that it is a ‘chimerical enterprise’ to seek recollections or the past perceptions in the brain, as it is not the recollection that is in the brain but the brain that is in the recollections[23]. Deleuze recognises in Bergson that recollection is preserved in duration, and following the concept of duration tells us that recollection is preserved in itself [24].
Given that Deleuze recognises in Bergson that recollection is not to be located in the brain (as the brain is considered matter and part of the material world), he then goes on to discuss what he calls the extra-psychological range emphasized in Bergson’s text. Deleuze writes:
What Bergson calls “pure recollection” has no psychological existence. This is why it is called virtual, inactive, and unconscious […] we must nevertheless be clear at this point that Bergson does not use the word “unconscious” to denote a psychological reality outside consciousness, but to denote a nonpsychological reality – being as it is in itself.[25]
Deleuze tells us that it is the present that is psychological, however it is the past that is ontological, or at the very least has ontological significance. Deleuze continues by raising a distinction in Bergson, where Bergson begins to discuss how we go to call up a recollection. That is, like the face recognition metaphor I used earlier, how we detach ourselves from the present in order to place ourselves into the past, and eventually in a particular position in the past. Bergson says that we ‘become conscious of an act sui generis’, or of its own kind (unique). This notion of placing ourselves into the past, Bergson tells us, is like the focussing of a camera, adjusting to the multitude and distinguishing the one. Bergson, goes on to tell us that the recollection remains virtual, and as we refine the memory it passes into the actual[26]. Deleuze reiterates and transforms this notion of placing ourselves into the past by suggesting a genuine leap, or a leap into ontology. That we leap into the past, into the nonpsychological reality:
We really leap into being, into being-in-itself, into the being in itself of the past. It is a case of leaving psychology altogether.[27]
As I understand this, the present requires the past which is essentially ontological, and Deleuze’s reading of Bergson tells us that the psychological is not in fact the unconscious as we would know it after Freud, but refers to a nonpsychological reality. My argument lies in this distinction of a leap into the nonpsychological, which I maintain decentres the human subject and shifts the dominance of being (designating being as it is in itself)[28], Deleuze writes:
[…] once the leap has been made, that recollection will gradually take on a psychological existence […] and gradually we give it an embodiment, a “psychologization”.[29]
Looking back at Braidotti’s claim in regards to the Deleuzean body being an embodied memory, the very consideration of the leap into the virtual for it to materialize shifts the condition of being to an inhuman realm. Being in its state of arrest or subordination leads Deleuze to develop his ontology of becoming, which for Deleuze works as a criticism of philosophies of being[30]. In consideration to the discussion above, we can see how Deleuze collapses being into a nonpsyhcological reality, shifting the centrality of the human subject. Deleuze speaks of becoming in the earlier passage in Bergsonism, Duration as Immediate Datum, in this he tells us that duration (as it appears in Time and Free Will, and furthermore Creative Evolution (L'Évolution Créatrice 1911) is becoming. A becoming which endures[31], it is not a change from A to B, but the process between two parts. Becoming can be defined with reference to Bergson’s duration, proposing an entity which endures though a series of continuous transformations.
Part 2: Memories of a Spinozist (I); Movement and Rest/Speeds and Slowness
The philosophy of becoming, I will argue, is a form of anti-essentialism or neovitalism which is interlinked with the posthuman condition. Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming relies on the posthuman not in order to replace the privileged image of man with another model which rethinks the emergence of life, but collapses the foundations of being with an affirmation of becoming. Braidotti leads us towards the philosophy of becoming as expressed in Deleuze’s collaborative text with Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, she writes:
Deleuze's emphasis on the project of reconfiguring the positivity of difference, his philosophy of becoming and the emphasis he places on thinking about changes and the speed of transformation are a very illuminating way to approach the complexities of our age[32].
Deleuze and Guattari refer to various kinds of becomings in A Thousand Plateaus, such as becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-animal, becoming-molecular and becoming-imperceptible. Becoming is not a kind of metamorphosis, from human to animal for example, it is not a change per say, but change is what becoming effects[33]. Rather than think of becoming as a change or metamorphosis, or from a start to the final transformation, to think of becoming is to acknowledge the endurance of change; it is the passage between points.
Deleuze in a reading of Nietzsche constructs a philosophy of becoming, Braidotti considers Deleuze to be ‘essentially Bergson and Nietzsche’. However, from Braidotti’s claim that the philosophy of becoming as the speed of transformation or changes, leads me towards Deleuze and Guattari’s first account of Spinoza. There are two aspects of Spinoza I will explore which is put to work when addressing becomings, the first that I will address is in the notion of speed and slowness. If we look at the chapter 1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible and specifically the short section titled Memories of a Spinozist I, Deleuze and Guattari write:
Substantial or essential forms have been critiqued in many different ways. Spinoza’s approach is radical: Arrive at elements that no longer have either form or function, that are abstracted in this sense even though they are perfectly real. They are distinguished solely by movement and rest, slowness and speed[34].
What Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge in Spinoza, and as we will see regarding Ethics (Ethica, Ordine Geometrico Demonstrate 1677), is a rethinking of what a thing is without having to return to substantial or essential forms. What we will see in Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Spinoza is a thought of becoming, where a thing can enter into becomings, which is perhaps restricted or subordinated when returning to the substantial forms.
Spinoza writes at IIL7S in Ethics, that ‘the whole of nature is one individual’, whereby all things, all bodies and their parts ‘vary in infinite ways, without any change to the whole individual’[35].
What Spinoza is alluding to here is the whole universe which he is explaining as being one infinite individual, which is in turn composed of an infinite number of individual parts, which includes a further series of individuals. As Spinoza writes at IIP8, every substance is ‘necessarily infinite’[36].
The notion of the continuum, within which things move and exist unities all physical bodies, all according to Spinoza are one continuous physical body, Spinoza writes at 11P11:
God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.[37]
Thus, if the universe is expressed as a single physical continuum, that everything is in substance (God)[38] as Spinoza puts forth, then how can we distinguish between two physical bodies? Given that things or bodies are traditionally differentiated by their substance?
Spinoza contends that things are distinguished by the ratio of motion, speed and rest, amongst their parts. In his ‘physical digression’[39], we see that all bodies either move or are at rest (IIA1’). Bodies are distinguished from each other by ‘reason of motion and rest, speed and slowness’ above reason of substance (IIL1). Bodies are in agreement with each other, as Spinoza tells us, a body at rest, for example, is determined by a body in motion, and so on ad infinitum. So, my leg is differentiated from the table leg next to it by motion, whereas my leg has the capacity for motion, the table leg is determined by rest, so it could be said that there is nothing physically recognisable that distinguishes one individual (my leg) to another (the table leg), except their capacity for motion.
Spinoza tells us at IIA2”[40] that when several bodies move at the same degree of speed, or when ‘they communicate their motions to each other in a certain fixed manner[41], they form a unity. For example, when a person rides a bike, ‘those bodies are united with one and other [so] that they all together compose one body or individual’[42], the bike and the person (cyclist) unite as one.
It appears that, on the basis that a body is distinguished based on relations of motion, that the integrity of human identity vanishes, and is distinguished against the universe in terms of other capacities of motion.
Spinoza talks of the human body as being composed of a multitude of individual parts. He writes in IIL7[43] that a human body is itself a composite individual, composed of many individual natures. Some of these individuals within the human body are composed of fluids (i.e. blood), some individuals are soft (i.e. flesh), others are hard (i.e. bone). Spinoza considers that these individual components of the human body are affected by other external bodies.
Deleuze and Guattari read in Spinoza that these individual elements (which are part of an actual infinity) are laid out on a ‘plane of consistency’. They consider these parts as not being defined by number or structure but rather ‘by virtue of the composition of the relation into which their parts enter’. That is, the composition of movement when I write with a pencil and the decomposition is when I put the pencil down[44]. The implication of this initial reading of Spinoza which Deleuze and Guattari transpose to their own thinking, is that becoming is possible surrounding the account of rest to motion. As I understand it, the reason of speeds and slowness which is found in Spinoza appears to be contrary to a thought which rests on the account of substance or essence.
As it appears, Being to Deleuze and Guattari is contrary to becoming, they tell us that ‘Being expresses in a single meaning all that differs’, and that they’re opposed to the ‘unity of substance’ and open up to an ‘infinity of the modifications that are part of one another on this unique plane of life’[45]. As I understand this, there is an idea here that Western thought subordinates this idea of becoming to the prioritised status of being. It is on the premise of Spinoza (who Deleuze recognises as a philosopher of difference), that becoming can operate without falling back or relying on traditional philosophical structures.
Part 3: Memories of a Spinozist (II); Affects.
Braidotti continues to address Deleuze’s philosophy of becoming (which I contend is further developed with his collaboration with Guattari), and given the implication of Spinoza as discussed above, Braidotti writes:
The process of becoming is collectively driven, that is to say relational and external; it is also framed by affectivity or desire, and is thus eccentric to rational control.[46]
The second premise that Braidotti emphasises, recognises the concept of affect which is also found in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Following the relation of speed and slowness or movement and rest of an infinity of parts, there corresponds intensities that affect them. Braidotti identifies a consideration of ‘rational control’, which I take to relate to structuralism, essentialism or the privilege of being in Western discourse. Deleuze and Guattari start from the question; what can a body do?[47]
Spinoza tells us in part three of Ethics; Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects, that affect as he understands it is the affections of the body, of which is the body’s power is increased or diminished (IID3)[48]. Spinoza writes at IIp12 that the ‘body is affected with a mode that involves the nature of that external body […] the body is affected with modes that increase or aid its power of acting’[49].
Affects are the desires or sensations of which arise in the body as a result of experience, affects determine our actions and behaviour[50]. Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of affect avoids a discussion of the body by species or genus characteristics, which they go on to call an ‘ethology’, they write;
[…] and this [ethology] is the sense in which Spinoza wrote a true Ethics[51].
Deleuze and Guattari recognise the potential of affects as being the basic unit of experience in nonhuman animals, and express this in the example of the tick. Deleuze and Guattari tell us that the tick, which becomes habitual to the tip of a branch, and of which is sensitive to the smell of mammals, lets itself fall onto said mammal and digs into its skin when one passes beneath the branch. They go onto write that the tick has just three affects;
The rest of the time the tick sleeps […] its degree of power [which is] indeed bounded by two limits: the optimal limit of the feast after which it dies, and the pessimal limit of the fast as it waits.[52]
Following the discussion of ethology, Deleuze and Guattari are interested here in what a body can do, suggesting that we know nothing of the body until we know what its affects are. Deleuze and Guattari continue following the account of affects, that to become is not to progress or regress along a series. Becomings are not dreams, they do not occur in the imagination but are ‘perfectly real’[53]. Becomings or the block of becoming, produces ‘nothing other than itself’[54], it has no teleological result, it is endurance. For a becoming to be real, Deleuze and Guattari strip it of imitation, in their example of Freud’s case study on ‘Little Hans’, Deleuze and Guattari tell us that there is no question of the child ‘playing’ horse, but it is a question of whether or not Little Hans can ‘endow his own elements with the relations of movements and rest, the affects, that would make it become horse’[55].
If we look to Bergson’s expression of becoming which appears in Creative Evolution, becoming is thought in terms of real duration[56], activity is fitted into the material world, in which matter appears to us as a ‘perceptual flowing’[57]. Our becoming, according to Bergson, is qualitative[58], it is not spatialised distinctions which are quantified, but varied differences of states. However, there is an implication of a hidden flow which is likened to a cinematograph. Bergson uses the metaphor to instruct us that like the contrivance of the cinematograph, we take snapshots of passing reality. The cinematograph, which is correlated to our knowledge, imitates what there is that is characteristic in this becoming itself, Bergson implies a secondary or virtual becoming which is added onto being. He tells us:
Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematograph inside us.[59]
Bergson, I maintain, explains that the flow of experience, action or images we posit are run through a centre which organises it all. However, Deleuze and Guattari invert this notion and insist upon an immanence of the flow[60], as we have seen above, becomings are not imitation. They are a composition of speeds and affects on the plane of consistency. The implication of the affect here is that it is the reality of the becoming, according to Deleuze and Guattari, are the drive in a person which represents nothing[61]. The implication, to bring this back around to the posthuman exposition, is that Deleuze and Guattari’s ethology does not reduce the subject to any hierarchy, identity or normality. Ethology, accordingly is anti-anthropocentricism, it does not position the integrity of human identity as a central power, rather, it looks at the relations into which bodies enter the world[62].
What are the implications of the philosophy of becoming that Deleuze and Guattari develop and how does it reposition the human subject so that we can consider the posthuman condition that Braidotti expresses? Through a reading of Spinoza which is attributed to Bergson’s supposition on becoming, allows Deleuze and Guattari to define a body and its material elements on the relations of movement and rest and the capacity for its intensive affects which is capable of a given power[63].
In conclusion, following my premise of relating this conception to the posthuman condition, Deleuze and Guattari as I have indicated prioritise becoming over the substantiation of being. Given their criticism of psychoanalysis and structuralism (which is arched between their earlier text Anti-Oedipus as part of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes), allows us to understand how the implication of a dissolution of the human subject is implied in the philosophy of becoming. Deleuze and Guattari write that psychoanalysis ‘has no feeling for unnatural participations’, its aim is to stabilise intensive forces such as affects. Becoming punctures the limits of striation and opens out to a reality which is not homogenised by structuralism (or psychoanalysis, following Deleuze and Guattari’s account), Deleuze and Guattari write:
Structuralism represents a great revolution; the whole world becomes more rational.[64]
Following this, they consider structuralism (which constitutes psychoanalytic discourse) as requiring tools and apparatuses to annul the organs; to ‘shut them away so that their liberated elements can enter into the new relations’. Therefore, we can assume that the philosophy of becoming (along with its Spinozist complacencies) is likewise withdrawn through the inscription of structuralism[65]. A homogenisation of intensive becomings restricts the ‘circulations of affects’[66].  
Deleuze’s reading of Bergson, which I have discussed, sets the premise of becoming through its decentring of recollection in relation to ontology. I believe that the trajectory from a slip or a break of the philosophy of being, to Deleuze and Guattari’s development in the philosophy of becoming which places emphasis on the inhuman relations to life, can satisfy the condition of the posthuman. Following Braidotti’s text, we can see how becoming rethinks the emergence of life, rather than replace it with another structure or model to annul the intensities. Through becoming, the body remains in constant flux, as Braidotti explained, the Deleuzean body is enfleshed meat which comes into action or is activated by waves of desire. The Deleuzean body is not restricted to a model of structuralism, but is a becoming-hybrid[67], and as such collapses the foundations which return the body to a homogenous state of being.
Bergson, H., Paul, N. and Palmer, S. (1911). Matter and memory. 1st ed. Nottinghamshire: Martino Publishing.
Buchanan, I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and Feminist Theory. 1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Colebrook, C. (2002). Gilles Deleuze. 1st ed. London: Routledge.
Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand plateaus. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Spinoza, B. and Curley, E. (1996). Ethics. 1st ed. London: Penguin.
Websites (2017). Spinoza, Benedict de: Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [online] Available at:

[1] Buchanan, I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and Feminist Theory. 1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p 158
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Herbrechter, S. (2013). Posthumanism. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic. p 37
[5] Gontarski, S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding Deleuze, Understanding modernism. 1st ed. New York: Bloomsbury. p 253
[6] Deleuze, G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism. 1st ed. New York: Zone Books. p 8
[7] Buchanan, I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and Feminist Theory p 159
[8] Deleuze, G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism. p 8
[9] Buchanan, I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and Feminist Theory p 159
[10] ibid
[11] Bergson, H., Paul, N. and Palmer, S. (1911). Matter and memory. 1st ed. Nottinghamshire: Martino Publishing. p 191
[12] Ibid p 193
[13] Ibid p 177
[14] Ibid p 194
[15] Gontarski, S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding Deleuze, Understanding modernism p 26
[16] Ibid p 198
[17] Bergson, H., Paul, N. and Palmer, S. (1911). Matter and memory. p 211 (fig. 5)
[18] ibid p 211
[19] ibid p 197
[20] ibid p 179
[21] ibid
[22] ibid p 173
[23] Bergson, H., Paul, N. and Palmer, S. (1911). Matter and memory. p 196
[24] Deleuze, G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism. p 54
[25] ibid p 56
[26] Bergson, H., Paul, N. and Palmer, S. (1911). Matter and memory. p 171
[27] Deleuze, G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism.  p 57
[28] Gontarski, S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding Deleuze, Understanding modernism p 26
[29] Deleuze, G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism.  p 57
[30] Gontarski, S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding Deleuze, Understanding modernism p 253
[31] Deleuze, G., Habberjam, B. and Tomlinson, H. (2011). Bergsonism.  p 37
[32] Buchanan, I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and Feminist Theory 165
[33] Gontarski, S., Ardoin, P. and Mattison, L. (2013). Understanding Deleuze, Understanding modernism p 253
[34] Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand plateaus. 1st ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic p 296
[35] Spinoza, B. and Curley, E. (1996). Ethics. 1st ed. London: Penguin. p 43
[36] ibid p 4
[37] Spinoza, B. and Curley, E. (1996). Ethics p 7
[38] Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics. 1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p 61
[39] (2017). Spinoza, Benedict de: Metaphysics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: [Accessed 11 Apr. 2017].
[40] Spinoza, B. and Curley, E. (1996). Ethics p 42
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid. p 43
[44] Adkins, B. (2015). Deleuze and Guattari's "A thousand plateaus". 1st ed. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p 141
[45] Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand plateaus. p 297
[46] Buchanan, I. and Colebrook, C. (2000). Deleuze and Feminist Theory p 170
[47] Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand plateaus. p 299
[48] Spinoza, B. and Curley, E. (1996). Ethics p 70
[49] Ibid p 78
[50] Lord, B. (2010). Spinoza's Ethics.  p 83
[51] Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand plateaus. p 299
[52] ibid p 300
[53] ibid p 277
[54] Ibid.
[55] ibid p 301
[56] Bergson, H. (1911). Creative Evolution. 3rd ed. New York: Greenwood Printing. p 324
[57] ibid p 330
[58] ibid
[59] Bergson, H. (1911). Creative Evolution p 332
[60] Colebrook, C. (2002). Gilles Deleuze. 1st ed. London: Routledge. p 128
[61] Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand plateaus. p 303
[62] Colebrook, C. (2002). Gilles Deleuze p 128
[63] Ibid p 304
[64] Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2014). A thousand plateaus. p 276
[65] Ibid p 303
[66] Ibid.
[67] Colebrook, C. (2002). Gilles Deleuze p 129